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Abstract
Governance of the health system is a relatively new concept and there are gaps in understanding
what health system governance is and how it could be assessed. We conducted a systematic review
of the literature to describe the concept of governance and the theories underpinning as applied to
health systems; and to identify which frameworks are available and have been applied to assess
health systems governance. Frameworks were reviewed to understand how the principles of govern-
ance might be operationalized at different levels of a health system. Electronic databases and web
portals of international institutions concerned with governance were searched for publications in
English for the period January 1994 to February 2016. Sixteen frameworks developed to assess gov-
ernance in the health system were identified and are described. Of these, six frameworks were de-
veloped based on theories from new institutional economics; three are primarily informed by political
science and public management disciplines; three arise from the development literature and four use
multidisciplinary approaches. Only five of the identified frameworks have been applied. These used
the principal–agent theory, theory of common pool resources, North’s institutional analysis and the
cybernetics theory. Governance is a practice, dependent on arrangements set at political or national
level, but which needs to be operationalized by individuals at lower levels in the health system; multi-
level frameworks acknowledge this. Three frameworks were used to assess governance at all levels
of the health system. Health system governance is complex and difficult to assess; the concept of
governance originates from different disciplines and is multidimensional. There is a need to validate
and apply existing frameworks and share lessons learnt regarding which frameworks work well in
which settings. A comprehensive assessment of governance could enable policy makers to prioritize
solutions for problems identified as well as replicate and scale-up examples of good practice.
Key words: Evaluation, frameworks, governance, health systems
Introduction
Governance is defined as the rules (both formal and informal) for
collective action and decision making in a system with diverse play-
ers and organizations while no formal control mechanism can dic-
tate the relationship among those players and organizations
(Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Some authors criticize the concept of
governance for being too vague (Schneider 2004:25) and there is
confusion over how best to conceptualize it (Kohler-Koch and
Rittberger 2006:28). Governance has been discussed in many discip-
lines such as political science, economics, social science, develop-
ment studies and international relations using different theories.
Governance matters as it is concerned with how different actors in
the world function and operate and the reasons behind their
decisions.
Political scientists are of the opinion that governance is not a sci-
ence which can be ‘adequately captured by laws, statues or formal
constitutions’ (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Governance is not easily
attained with laws, statutes or formal constitutions, rather it is a sys-
tem level concept (macro level) in which systems or societies are
driven by networks. Each network involves multiple nodes (organ-
izations) with many linkages collaborating on different activities
(McGuire 2010:437). The assumption is that passing a law or decree
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from a formal authority cannot in itself achieve engagement of key
actors, and negotiation is key to success of governance within net-
works (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Political scientists have also ex-
pressed concerns that there are insufficient tools to hold people
accountable as governance is characterized by complicated policy
networks and responsibility is diffused and shared among many
stakeholders (Stoker 2006).
Governance in new institutional economics focuses on the role
of institutions which shape interactions among actors within the
constraints of the institutions (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Choices
are made within the context of institutional rules that shape and
govern what is decided (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). This concept of
governance has received support from other disciplines including
political science. New institutional economists describe governance
as a series of actions which secure voluntary co-operation among
key actors.
Governance is becoming more important in international devel-
opment, particularly due to the movement towards ‘good govern-
ance’ in international aid. The World Bank has played a central role
in bringing governance into the development agenda, introducing
the concept of ‘good governance’ in 1989 in a landmark report on
sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1989). The
report encouraged donor countries to be ‘selective’ and to give aid to
countries with a ‘good policy environment’ (Chhotray and Stoker
2009). In many ways, governance has been used as a political tool in
international development, although this is often denied (Chhotray
and Stoker 2009).
In relation to health, governance was introduced in the World
Health Report in 2000, where the World Health Organization
(WHO) defined it in terms of ‘stewardship’, and called for strategic
policy frameworks combined with effective oversight, regulation, in-
centives and accountability. This definition is based on political ideol-
ogy; that the health system can be influenced by transparent rules,
governed by effective oversight and strong accountability (WHO
2007). More recently, health system governance has been described as
‘an aggregation of normative values such as equity and transparency
within the political system in which a health system functions’
(Balabanova et al. 2013). As efforts to strengthen health systems and
health service delivery have accelerated during the last few decades,
governance has received increasing attention. Prominent international
development partners have described governance as being the ‘most
important factor’ for poverty alleviation and development (Graham
et al. 2003).
Governance comprises different functions both within and out-
side the health sector. In the literature these are commonly
described as ‘principles’, ‘concepts’, ‘dimensions’, ‘components’ or
‘attributes’. These terms tend to be used synonymously in the lit-
erature. For this review, we used the term ‘principles’. Research is
needed both to explore each of the principles of governance in
more depth and, to describe and assess governance more generally,
in order to identify ways of improving health systems (Lowenson
2008).
Our own work is predominantly around improving availability
and quality of maternal and newborn health services in low- and
middle-income countries; and we hypothesize that governance prin-
ciples, if implemented effectively, can make a difference to the func-
tioning of healthcare facilities. Our primary aim was to understand
which frameworks for assessing governance in health systems have
been developed and how these try to operationalize and/or assess
how governance principles at different levels of a health system are
implemented. Duran and Saltman (2015) describe hospital govern-
ance as dependent on three interrelated levels; (1) the macro-level
(health system within which the health facility operates); (2) the
meso-level (institutional decision-making) and (3) the micro-level
(hospital management focusing on day-to-day operations). Our mo-
tivation for summarizing and critiquing frameworks for governance
is to understand whether and how they might inform the assessment
of governance at the operational service delivery level of a health
system (the health facility). In doing so, we acknowledge that frame-
works can provide direction on what to consider in assessing gov-
ernance, but, given the diffuse nature of governance, there is
unlikely to be a generic way of assessing governance in health
systems.
We conducted a systematic review of the literature to: (1) de-
scribe and critique how the concept of governance and the theories
underpinning it have been applied to health systems globally; and
(2) identify if and how frameworks have been developed and used to
assess governance in the health system.
Methods
Search strategy and inclusion criteria
We developed two inclusion criteria to meet the above mentioned
review objectives. For the first objective, we included any type of re-
port or peer reviewed journal article that reported frameworks for
assessing or defining health systems governance. For the second ob-
jective we were interested only in articles reporting research or
evaluations of the application of governance frameworks (Table 1).
We were only interested in articles reporting on governance frame-
works which can be applied to the health sector, irrespective of dis-
ciplines. The search was limited to English language articles between
January 1994 (the year when the term Governance was introduced
by the World Bank) and February 2016.
We searched five electronic databases (Scopus, Medline,
CINAHL, Global Health Database, Cochrane Library) using key
words combined with the Boolean operators (AND, OR). For ex-
ample, the key words for governance (governance, leadership, ac-
countability, stewardship) were combined with terms relating to the
health system (healthcare system, healthcare industry, healthcare re-
form, health system strengthening) and terms for frameworks
(model, framework, indicator, definition, measure). All the terms
were searched in abstracts, key words, subject headings, titles and
text words. We searched Medline first, and adapted this search
Key Messages
• Health system governance is one of the neglected agendas in health system research.
• There is currently a lack of evidence with regard to how governance can and is assessed at both national and sub-
national level.
• Existing frameworks can be adapted to assess governance overall or specific components of governance.
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strategy for use with other databases. Search strategies used in each
database, including search terms, search strings and results, are out-
lined in Supplementary Table S1.
In addition to the database search, we searched the online arch-
ives of specific journals that publish research on health systems and
policy including ‘Health Policy and Planning’ and ‘Health Policy’
using ‘health systems governance’ as the key search term. Web por-
tals of institutions including the Basel Institute for Governance, the
World Bank and USAID Leadership, Management and Governance
project were also searched. Furthermore, we checked the reference
lists of studies that met our inclusion criteria and contacted the au-
thors of identified frameworks to ask for any unpublished reports
which were considered relevant.
Assessment of quality of included studies
We did not appraise the quality of studies describing frameworks
health systems governance, as these were largely descriptive reports
(Objective 1). For objective two, we included articles reporting em-
pirical research, and we assessed the quality of these studies using
simple criteria based on published checklists (Crombie 1996).
Because the study designs were diverse, we appraised studies based
on: the description of the study (aim, participants, methods, out-
comes); the methods (appropriate to the aim, selection of partici-
pants, valid and reliable data collection methods, and adequate
description of analysis) and presentation of the study findings. For
qualitative studies, this included questions about appropriateness
and reliability of analysis; and for those reporting quantitative data,
we assessed whether the basic data were adequately described, and
whether statistical significance was assessed.
The review identified a total of 10 empirical studies of which 9
were peer-reviewed, 3 were rated as high and 7 as medium quality.
(Supplementary Table S2) All studies provided adequate descrip-
tions regarding information of the study such as aims, study partici-
pants, methods employed and their intended measures. Seven
studies used qualitative methods (interviews, focus group discus-
sions), one used a quantitative method (survey) (Abimbola et al.
2015b) and two were mixed-methods studies (Mutale et al. 2012;
Avelino et al. 2013). Seven studies provided information on how
study participants were selected (Huss et al. 2011; Avelino et al.
2013; Mutale et al. 2013; Vian and Bicknell 2013; Abimbola et al.
2015a,b, 2016).
Seven studies provided information on methods of data analysis
Baez-Camargo and Kamujuni 2011; Avelino et al. 2013; Mutale
et al. 2013; Vian and Bicknell 2013; Abimbola et al. 2015a,b,2016.
Among the seven studies which used qualitative methods, quotes
were included in five; (Baez-Camargo and Kamujuni 2011; Huss
et al. 2011; Vian and Bicknell, 2013; Abimbola et al. 2015a, 2016).
All three studies which conducted statistical analysis provided a ra-
tionale for statistical calculations used.
Synthesis of review findings
As governance originates from many different disciplines, we under-
took an in-depth analysis offering a theory-informed critique of the
identified frameworks and of the literature on governance, extend-
ing beyond health systems. The findings of included studies were
synthesized using narrative synthesis which is useful in synthesizing
different types of studies without losing the diversity in study designs
and contexts (Lucas et al. 2007; Barnett-Page and Thomas 2009;
Wong et al. 2013). Included studies are summarized by objective in
the results section, and by grouping them by the disciplines from
which the frameworks originate.
Results
Description of included studies
We identified a total of 373 articles through database searching and
39 through other sources, of which 25 met the inclusion criteria
(Figure 1) (Table 2).
Sixteen articles describe frameworks for assessing governance
and 10 empirical research studies which describe how frameworks
Table 1. Inclusion criteria used to select papers for each stated objective
Objective Inclusion criteria
1. Identify frameworks assessing governance as related to
health systems
Studies (descriptive, reports of international organizations and research insti-
tutions) describing or reporting on frameworks developed for the assess-
ment, conceptualization or description of health systems governance.
2. Identify research that explores application of governance
frameworks to health systems
Studies (descriptive, observational, intervention studies) that describe the use
of governance frameworks in the context of health systems or services.
Figure 1. Flow diagram of study selection procedure and results (adapted
from PRISMA 2009)
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can potentially be used to assess health systems governance were
identified.
One previous review on governance (a non-peer reviewed report)
was conducted to inform the development of a framework which
would be specifically used in surveys of the countries included in the
Health Systems 20/20 project (Shukla and Johnson Lassner 2012).
The report provides an overview of the current literature on govern-
ance in the health sector. The authors discuss 10 principles termed
‘enablers’ in detail and outline existing frameworks; highlighting
how effective governance is associated with health outcomes in three
country-level studies.
I. Description and critique of governance frameworks
We identified a total of 16 frameworks developed to assess govern-
ance in the health system. Of these, six frameworks were developed
based on theories from new institutional economics; three are pri-
marily informed by political science and public management discip-
lines; three arise from the development literature and four use
multidisciplinary approaches (Table 3).
Frameworks originating from new institutional economics. Six
frameworks conceptually originate from New Institutional
Economics: EC (2009), Baez-Camargo (2011), Brinkerhoff and
Bossert (2008), Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2013), Cleary et al.
(2013) and Abimbola et al. (2014). Among these, five use ‘princi-
pal–agent’ theory (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008; European
Commission 2009; Baez-Camargo 2011; Baez-Camargo and Jacobs
2013; Cleary et al. 2013) while Abimbola et al. (2014) use Ostrom’s
theory of ‘common pool resources’.
Principal–agent theory. In ‘principal–agent’ theory, a ‘principal’ hires
or contracts an ‘agent’ to undertake a particular service (Chhotray
and Stoker 2009). Agents may have similar as well as different ob-
jectives from those of the principal. Agents, usually have more infor-
mation than the principal, providing them with an advantage to
pursue their own interests at the expense of the principal.
Fundamentally, the theory looks at how much of the value that the
agent produces should go back to him/her in the form of incentives
i.e. the agent (healthcare provider) produces certain services for the
principal (the government), for which the agent expects some form
of payment (Chhotray and Stoker 2009).
The other distinctive feature of the ‘principal–agent’ theory is
that the principal does not have complete control over the agent and
only has partial information pertaining to the behaviour (produc-
tion) of the agent (Stoker 1998). This can lead to difficulties such as
selection of agents, negotiation of services and monitoring of the in-
formation. Therefore, governance frameworks using the ‘principal–
agent’ theory take into account the uncertainty and complexity of
the outcomes of the behaviour of the agent (Stoker 1998).
Frameworks to assess health systems governance that draw on
‘principal agent’ theory, assume that governance is the result of
interactions among principals and agents with diverse interests. Two
key assumptions using ‘principal–agent’ theory are; (1) there are in-
centives and sanctions for the different actors which are
performance-based and are used to stimulate accountability and,
Table 2. Overview of governance frameworks for health systems by type of discipline used to develop the framework
Disciplines Name of the framework (underlying theory if any) Application in empirical research
(Author, year) (Country)
New Institutional Economics Multi-level framework of Abimbola et al. (2014) (Theory of common
pool resources)
Abimbola et al. (2015a)
Abimbola et al. (2015b) (Nigeria)
Accountability framework of Baez-Camargo (2011) (Principal–agent
theory)
No
Social accountability framework of Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2013)
(Principal–agent theory)
No
Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s framework (2008, 2013) (Principal–agent
theory)
Mutale et al. (2012) (Zambia)
Ramesh et al. (2013) (only literature
review)
Vian (2011) (Vietnam)
Accountability framework of Cleary et al. (2013) (Principal–agent
theory)
No (only literature review)
European Commission (2009) (Principal–agent theory) No
Political Science and Public
Administration
Health work’s accountability framework of Berlan and Shiffman
(2012)
No (only literature review)
Accountability assessment framework of Brinkerhoff (2004) No
Patron–client relationship framework of Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith
(2004)
No
International Development Framework of Islam (2007) No
Health development governance framework of Kirigia and Kirigia
(2011)
No
Framework of Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. (2011) No
Multidisciplinary Governance framework of Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011) Baez-Camargo and Kamujuni (2011)
(Uganda)
Governance assessment framework of Siddiqi et al. (2009) Siddiqi et al. (2009) (Pakistan)
Cybernetic framework of Smith et al. (2012) (System theory) Smith et al. (2012) (Australia, England,
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland)
Vian (2008) framework to identify corruption in the health sector
(Theory of institutional analysis—North 1990)
No
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(2) information asymmetry and power difference among different
groups. Healthcare users are normally regarded as ‘principals’ while
the state and healthcare providers are ‘agents’ providing healthcare
services to users (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008; European
Commission 2009; Baez-Camargo 2011; Baez-Camargo and Jacobs
2013; Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2013; Cleary et al. 2013). Agents
provide services to principals as long as they have some incentive to
do so, but they have more information than principals. At the same
time, principals will find ways to overcome the information asym-
metry without incurring high transaction costs. For instance, users
will look for alternative providers by comparing price, quality or
value. In addition, context matters in these frameworks as the ‘prin-
cipal–agent’ model is a highly complex set of interactions and not a
closed system. It helps to explore how policy makers respond to citi-
zen demands, how health service providers and users engage to im-
prove service quality, and how service providers and users advocate
and report on health outcomes.
The framework by Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008, 2013) is based
on a World Bank (2004) accountability framework. The framework
depicts three principal–agent relationships: government and health-
care providers; healthcare providers and citizens; and government
and citizens. The other framework which uses the ‘principal–agent’
theory is the governance framework of the European Commission
(2009). The EC (2009) framework aims to assess governance at sec-
tor level especially in the context of development and aid assistance
worldwide. The EC framework takes into account the importance
of context and assessment starts with context analysis and stake-
holder mapping. Similarly to the framework by Brinkerhoff and
Bossert (2008, 2013), the EC framework considers power, inter-
actions and functions of stakeholders as core governance issues, but
also includes principles of participation, inclusion, transparency and
accountability. Among different principles, the framework focuses
on accountability among different stakeholder groups. Though the
framework is intended to be used for development and aid assist-
ance, the framework does not include citizens among the defined
clusters of stakeholders. The EC (2009) framework has a ready-to-
use tool with detailed instructions. Examples from previous EC
projects globally are provided with suggestions on how to improve
governance. Although the authors do not empirically test the frame-
work, they suggest how it might be applied it to a fictional country
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Baez-Camargo (2011) and Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2013)
proposed an analytical framework of ‘social-accountability’ by
adapting the World Bank accountability model (World Bank 2004).
Using the ‘principal–agent’ theory, Baez-Camargo (2011) presented
incentives and sanctions within two routes towards accountability:
short (direct) and long (indirect) routes. Direct accountability is
most suitable in the competitive market where citizens can ‘voice’
their preference or choose other alternatives (exit). On the other
hand, with indirect accountability, the link between citizens and
healthcare providers is considered ‘indirect’ as the government agent
is involved in the accountability relationship; citizens hold the gov-
ernment agent accountable either through political representation
(votes) and the government holds healthcare providers accountable
to deliver healthcare services. Direct accountability has received the
most attention as it can be promoted either through citizens’ partici-
pation in service planning, or voicing concern about service pro-
viders’ performance (voice), or through citizens’ choosing other
providers (exit). However, it is important to be careful about apply-
ing the concept of direct accountability to health care in settings
where market competition fails to provide healthcare services to the
most vulnerable groups. The authors include tools for key informant
interviews.
Another framework using ‘principal–agent’ theory is the ac-
countability assessment framework for low- and middle-income
countries developed by Cleary et al. (2013). By adapting the
Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) framework, the authors emphasize
the accountability pathways among three groups of key actors (pol-
iticians/policy makers; healthcare providers and citizens). The
Cleary framework claims to assess both external and internal ac-
countability mechanisms via three critical factors: resources, atti-
tudes and values. The authors highlight that adequate resources are
critical for the health system to function properly while it is import-
ant to understand the attitudes of healthcare providers and policy
makers without neglecting the values of citizens.
Theory of common pool resources. Our review identified one frame-
work which uses theory derived primarily from economics; Elinor
Ostrom’s theory of ‘common pool resources’ (Ostrom 1990). This
theory describes governance as an autonomous system with self-
governing networks (or systems) of actors (Stoker 1998). The theory
assumes that actors in self-governing networks can not only influ-
ence government policy but can also take over some of the business
of the government (Stoker 1998). Ostrom’s theory focuses on creat-
ing different institutional arrangements to manage open resources
which are finite. Communities can form self-organized networks or
systems composed of interested actors who will develop incentives
and sanctions to manage the resources on their own (Stoker 1998).
The theory assumes that self-organized systems are more effective
than regulation imposed by the government as there will be
increased availability of information and reduced transaction costs
(Stoker 1998). Indeed, the theory postulates that in situations where
government is ‘under-governed’, social norms fill those gaps (Olivier
de Sardan 2015). A similar assumption is highlighted by Dixit
(2009) civil-society organizations and non-governmental organ-
izations emerge to fill gaps in functioning when government organ-
izations serve poorly. The theory proposes that there are three levels
of a common pool resource problem: (1) an operational level where
the working rules are set, (2) a collective level where communities
set their own rules, and, (3) a constitutional level from where the set
rules originate (Ostrom, 1990:45).
Using Ostrom’s theory of ‘common pool resources’, Abimbola
et al. (2014) developed a multi-level framework to analyse primary
healthcare (PHC) governance in low- and middle-income countries.
The authors borrowed the concept of ‘governing without govern-
ment’ in situations where overall governance situations are not func-
tioning. In such situations, communities with similar interest might
develop their own rules and arrangements to manage the common
pool. Ostrom argued that self-governing arrangements lead individ-
uals or groups to cope with problems by constantly going back and
forth across levels as their key strategy. Abimbola’s framework
(2014) describes the three collective levels of health system hierarchy
as; (1) operational (citizens and healthcare providers), (2) collective
(community groups) and (3) constitutional governances (govern-
ments at different levels). A multi-level framework is believed to be
more effective at assessing governance than a single unit assessment.
Operational and collective governance can mitigate the failure of
constitutional governance, although, there is also some overlapping
of roles and responsibilities.
Frameworks originating from political science and public adminis-
tration. Three frameworks conceptually originate from political
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science and public administration disciplines: Berlan and Shiffman
(2012), Brinkerhoff (2004) and Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2004).
None of the frameworks mention any particular theory on which
their frameworks are based. The concept of governance for political
scientists focuses on ‘formal institutions, accountability, trust and le-
gitimacy’ for governance (Pierre and Peters 2005:5). They are inter-
ested to see how collective decisions are made among key actors
(both government and non-government actors) with different power
(Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Thus, governance from political sci-
ence and public administration focuses on both inputs (the proc-
esses) and outputs (results of governing networks) (Chhotray and
Stoker 2009).
Berlan and Shiffman’s framework (2011) assumes that health-
care providers in low- and middle-income countries have limited ac-
countability to their consumers as a result of both health system and
social factors. Oversight mechanisms, revenue source and nature of
competition are related to the health system while consumer power
and provider norms are considered under social factors. Their
framework helps to identify factors which shape the accountability
of healthcare providers. In addition, social interactions and norms
operating within the system and context are prominent features of
this framework.
Brinkerhoff’s framework (2004) is also based on accountability,
and aims to map out public accountability mechanisms: financial,
performance and political accountability. In this framework, per-
formance accountability is defined as agreed upon targets which
should theoretically be responsive to the needs of the citizens.
Political accountability emphasizes that electoral promises made by
the government should be fulfilled. Brinkerhoff highlights the need
to map out the accountability linkages among key actors and to
examine actors’ interactions as too few linkages can lead to corrup-
tion while too many can undermine accountability effectiveness.
Together with his framework, Brinkerhoff proposes three strategies
to strengthen accountability; (1) addressing fraud, misuse of re-
sources and corruption, (2) assuring compliance with procedures
and standards and (3) improving performance. The framework in-
cludes an accountability assessment matrix which allows the user to
rate accountability linkages among key actors.
The third framework that draws on political science assesses the
patron–client relationship or clientelism in health systems (Brinkerhoff
and Goldsmith 2004). Despite the unpopularity of clientelism, it is re-
garded as an essential principle of governance which can affect corrup-
tion and accountability mostly at macro/national level. The purpose of
the framework is to identify reasons why clientelistic practices persist
and the authors use the concept of realist evaluation theory comprising
of context, actions (mechanisms) and outcomes. Although the frame-
work has not been used in the field, the authors present a diagnostic
framework with sample questionnaires.
Frameworks originating from international development. In the de-
velopment literature, governance focuses on predefined principles
which development specialists believe to be critical for ‘good gov-
ernance’ in aid assistance. The three frameworks identified (Islam et
al. 2007; Kirigia and Kirigia 2011; Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. 2011)
focus primarily on how governance is defined, how it can facilitate
effective aid policy, and, unlike any of the other frameworks, those
in international development are concerned with how governance
might be measured. Kauffman and Kraay (2007) propose to measure
governance in two ways using rule-based measures (e.g. a policy or
a procedure exists) and outcome-based measures (e.g. the policy has
been implemented or the rule has been enforced) (Chhotray and
Stoker 2009).
Islam (2007) present a health systems assessment manual which
includes a framework to assess governance, developed under the
Health Systems 20/20 project (USAID). The aim is to guide data col-
lection providing a rapid but comprehensive assessment of key
health system functions. Based on the six domains of the health sys-
tem (1) service delivery; (2) health workforce; (3) health information
systems; (4) access to essential medicines; (5) financing; and (6) lead-
ership and governance. This framework groups indicators into gen-
eral governance (e.g. voice and accountability; political stability;
government effectiveness; rule of law; regulatory quality and control
of corruption) and health system specific governance indicators (e.g.
information/assessment capacity; policy formulation and planning;
social participation and system responsiveness; accountability; and
regulation). The authors suggest various sources of data for the dif-
ferent indicators, including interviews with relevant key stake-
holders and desk-based review of relevant documents and reports.
Another framework that attempts to measure governance is one
based upon Siddiqi et al. (2009), which also includes principles of
macroeconomic and political stability (Kirigia and Kirigia 2011).
The authors emphasize that development in health cannot occur
without political and economic stability in the form of a national
economic development plan or poverty reduction strategy, a
medium-term government expenditure framework, and a non-
violent electoral process. The authors argue that individual and ag-
gregate scores of governance are needed to alert policy makers to
areas needing improvement. This is the only framework identified in
our review which tries to quantify governance by using rule-based
measures such as existence of certain policy or guidelines. The au-
thors propose a scoring system that determines whether governance
is very poor (0%) or excellent (100%) for each function. Kirigia and
Kirigia (2011) argue that scoring allows assessors to identify areas
for improvement, and an overall index representing the overall gov-
ernance situation in any given country can be calculated.
The final framework (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al. 2011) is based on
systems thinking, and uses a problem-driven approach to assess gov-
ernance in relation to an identified problem to highlight the barriers
to good governance. The framework assesses governance in all four
levels of a health system (national, district, facility and community)
using the established WHO health system building blocks and five
proposed principles of governance: (1) strategic vision and policy de-
sign; (2) participation and consensus orientation; (3) accountability;
(4) transparency; and (5) control of corruption. The authors de-
veloped this approach in response to other frameworks on govern-
ance that provide snapshots of any given governance situation, but
are unable to identify specific areas of weakness and/or how to inter-
vene. However, despite providing a way to identify barriers to good
governance, the framework does not easily allow for comparisons
between different contexts, and it is not clear if it has actually been
applied in practice.
Frameworks originating from more than one discipline. Four frame-
works appear to be based on principles of more than one discipline
(Vian 2008; Siddiqi et al. 2009; Baez Camargo and Jacobs 2011;
Smith et al. 2012). Three of these (Vian 2008; Siddiqi et al. 2009;
Baez Camargo and Jacobs 2011) draw on the ‘institutional analysis’
theory of North (1990), originally derived from new institutional
economics. The frameworks also seem to reflect predefined govern-
ance principles in line with the international development literature.
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Theory of ‘institutional analysis’. Douglas North’s theory of institu-
tional analysis assumes that markets are created and maintained by
institutions. North defined ‘institutions’ as the rules of the game and
‘organizations’ as the players. Institutions consist of formal rules
and informal constraints while organizations consist of groups of in-
dividuals with common objectives (North 1990). North’s principal
argument is that individuals within an institution have certain
opportunities which are the result of specific formal and informal
constraints that constitute the institutions. Using the theory of
North (1990), Vian (2008), Siddiqi et al. (2009) and Baez Camargo
and Jacobs (2011) highlighted that institutional analysis is key to as-
sessing governance in order to understand the institutional arrange-
ment and rules set by the organizations. A mapping of the power
distribution can be used to identify the key decision makers who af-
fect the behaviour of health system actors.
In addition to application of North’s theory of institution ana-
lysis, Siddiqi et al. (2009) propose a comprehensive framework to
assess governance based on the UNDP principles of governance.
This framework includes ten principles, disaggregated into 63 broad
questions under three relevant domains: context, processes and out-
comes. In conceptualizing governance in this way, the authors sug-
gest that their framework could be used to compare governance
functions across countries. The framework is intended for use at
both national (policy formulation) and sub-national levels (policy
implementation and health facility levels) to assess all essential prin-
ciples of health systems governance; something which other frame-
works do not aim to do. In particular, the potential for application
of the framework at subnational level is a unique feature as most
other governance frameworks are developed for macro-level
assessment.
Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011) propose an ‘inputs, processes
and outputs’ framework for health systems governance in low-in-
come countries. The authors acknowledge the existence of other
frameworks to assess health systems, but set theirs apart by focusing
on generating information on the complex context within which the
health system operates. The framework draws on the values of good
governance articulated in the development literature, and
‘Institutional analysis’ to map out key stakeholders and the power
distribution among them. The framework is presented as a visual
process map of causal links between inputs, processes and outcomes,
which they believe helps to provide a better explanation of govern-
ance and easier application of the framework. The authors provide
detailed methodology, tools and procedures for using the framework
in practice, but acknowledge that their model cannot assess health
systems governance in its entirety. It is recommended for use in con-
texts where a particular problem has first been identified.
Vian’s (2008) framework specifically analyses corruption in the
health system from the perspective of the government. It draws on
North’s principal argument that key players in the health system
have certain opportunities which are the product of formal and in-
formal rules and constraints set by institutions (North 1990). The
author also employs ‘principal–agent’ theory as the framework takes
into account asymmetric information among different actors with
diverse interests within a health system. The framework is based on
the assumption that corruption in the health sector is driven by pres-
sures of government agents to abuse, opportunity to abuse, and so-
cial factors supporting abuse of the system. Therefore, the
framework is diagnostic in nature as it aims to identify potential
abuse that can occur at each step of a health service delivery process.
Smith et al. (2012) describe a ‘cybernetic’ framework for leader-
ship and governance which uses systems theory. This theory is inter-
disciplinary and is concerned with discovering patterns in the way
systems (including health systems) operate. Smith et al. consider it
important to view governance as hierarchical (rules and responsibil-
ities for allocating resources) and horizontal (both incentives and the
market regulate purchasing power, and systems produce common
values and knowledge through professional norms). Cybernetics
focuses on how systems use information, and how systems monitor
actions to steer towards their goals. The framework includes three
key principles related to this: setting priorities, accountability (in-
puts into the health system) and performance monitoring (output).
The framework focuses on the leadership principle of governance
and was developed for use in health systems in high-income coun-
tries, so would require adaptation to low-and middle-income
settings.
II. Description of how frameworks have been applied to assess
governance in health systems
Among the 16 frameworks identified that can potentially be used to
evaluate health systems governance, only 5 (Brinkerhoff and Bossert
2008; Siddiqi et al. 2009; Baez-Camargo and Jacobs 2011; Smith
et al. 2013; Abimbola et al. 2014) have actually been applied.
(Supplementary Table S2).
Among the 12 publications describing how frameworks have
been applied, seven use ‘principal–agent’ theory; two make use of
the theory of ‘common pool resources’; two use North’s institutional
analysis; and one uses ‘cybernetics’ theory.
Studies which used ‘principal–agent’theory . Among frameworks
using ‘principal–agent theory’, Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s framework
is the most commonly applied (five studies; Mutale et al. 2012; Vian
et al. 2012; Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2013; Cleary et al. 2013;
Ramesh et al. 2013) while the other three studies (Huss et al. 2011,
Avelino et al. 2013; Vian and Bicknell 2013) used a variant of the
‘principal–agent’ theory. The USAID health system assessment team
used Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s governance framework in their man-
ual for assessing health systems. According to Health Systems 20/20,
the manual is currently used in 23 Health Systems 20/20 projects
funded by the USAID in countries in East, West, and Southern
Africa, as well as in the Caribbean islands (Health Systems 20/20,
2012).
Mutale et al. (2012) adapted Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s frame-
work to assess governance at health facility level in Zambia while
Ramesh et al. (2013) used the framework at national level in China.
Cleary et al. (2014) adapted Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s framework to
assess accountability mechanisms in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. Vian et al. (2012) employed Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s frame-
work to assess corruption in the Vietnamese health system.
Three other studies (Huss et al. 2011; Avelino et al. 2013; Vian
and Bicknell 2013) applied the ‘principal–agent’ theory to assess
governance in Brazil, India and Lesotho. Huss et al. (2011) applied
a variant of the ‘principal–agent’ model in their assessment of gov-
ernance focusing on corruption in Karnataka State, India. Contrary
to the traditional application of ‘principal–agent’, Huss et al. refer
to the ‘state’ as ‘principal’ while ‘public service providers’ are
‘agents’ to deliver certain services for ‘citizens’.
All studies used two principal–agent relationships—the relation-
ship between citizens and government and between government and
healthcare providers—with the exception of Vian and Bicknell
(2013) who use a single principal–agent model (state-healthcare pro-
vider). The studies evaluate the principal and agent engage and
interact to accomplish a collective effort and clearly highlight the
importance of information asymmetry.
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Studies which used ‘multilevel framework’ of governance. Two stud-
ies (Abimbola et al. 2015a,b) applied the ‘multilevel framework’ by
Abimbola et al. (2014).
Abimbola et al. (2015a) adapted the ‘multilevel framework’ to
identify the effect of decentralization on retention of PHC workers
in Nigeria. The framework was used to assess government, com-
munities and intrinsic health workers’ factors influencing retention
of PHC workers in a decentralized health system. The framework
helped identify incentives for, and motivation of, PHC workers and
the reasons they remain in post despite socio-economic hardship.
The ‘multilevel framework’ was also applied to provide recommen-
dations to improve health system governance at operational level
among tuberculosis (TBC) patients in Nigeria (Abimbola et al. 2015b).
The framework was used to assess the three different levels of govern-
ance: constitutional (federal government); collective (communities) and
operational (healthcare providers at local health market). In this, the
concept of Williamson’s Transaction Cost Theory (1979) was used to
identify the costs incurred by TBC patients to receive appropriate anti-
TBC treatment from a qualified provider working within the health
system. Transaction costs are difficult to measure thus Williamson sug-
gested looking into ‘the issues of governance comparatively’. The cen-
tral argument of Williamson’s theory is that ‘high transaction costs’
can be attributed to governance failure which requires looking for al-
ternative modes of governance to achieve ‘economizing’ results
(Williamson 1999). In both studies, self-governing individuals at three
levels of a system are trying to overcome a common problem by iden-
tifying ways which are workable for them.
Studies which used North’s theory of ‘institutional analysis’. Siddiqi
et al. (2009) used their own framework to assess governance of the
health system in Pakistan, and explored governance principles in
depth using qualitative interviews. The authors assessed three differ-
ent levels of the health system—national (policy formulation) and
sub-national levels (policy implementation and health facility levels).
The authors highlighted the importance of understanding the socio-
political context of a country and show that the principles of health
systems governance are value driven. In addition, Siddiqi et al. em-
phasize that health system governance can be improved without im-
proving the overall governance of a country.
Baez-Camargo and Kamujuni (2011) conducted an assessment of
the governance of the public sector drug management system in
Uganda using the framework of Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011). The
assessment started with an institutional mapping which included inter-
views with both formal and informal sectors of the supply chain in
Uganda. Focus group discussions were also conducted with healthcare
providers, patients and representatives of patient advocacy groups.
Others. Smith et al. (2012) applied their cybernetic framework at na-
tional level to seven health systems in high-income settings (Australia,
England, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland).
The framework is composed of three key nodes of governance (setting
priorities, accountability and performance monitoring) which serve as
the guiding principle for assessing hierarchy, market and network gov-
ernance. One important lesson highlighted by the authors is that compe-
tency and capacity at the different levels of a health system are crucial for
successful implementation of the leadership and governance model.
Discussion
This systematic review brings together the literature on health sys-
tems governance, firstly by describing and critiquing how the
concept of governance and the theories underpinning it have been
applied to health systems, and secondly by identifying which frame-
works have been used to assess health systems governance, and how
this has been done to date globally. A total of 16 frameworks were
identified, which, in principle, can be used at national (policy formu-
lation) and sub-national (policy implementation) levels of a health
system. Frameworks originate mainly from three disciplines: (1) new
institutional economics; (2) political science and public administra-
tion; and (3) the international development literature.
The most commonly used theories which underpin the available
frameworks originate from new institutional economics and include
the ‘principal–agent’ theory, Douglas North’s theory of institutional
analysis and Elinor Ostrom’s theory of ‘common pool resources’.
Frameworks that originate from the development literature tend to
pre-define principles of governance and are the only ones to attempt
to measure governance (for instance, Kirigia and Kirigia 2011). The
majority of frameworks assess overall governance while some assess
specific principles of governance such as accountability, corruption
and patron–client relationship.
Most frameworks assess governance in health systems using
qualitative methodology, based on the premise that governance is
the result of interactions among different actors within a health sys-
tem, and that studying the reasons for and the extent of interaction
can be used to document good governance. Other authors propose
using mixed methods; collecting data on framework indicators (e.g.
Mutale et al. 2012) in combination with in-depth exploration of spe-
cific problems identified.
It is encouraging to see that there are three frameworks that have
been used to assess governance at all levels of the health system;
Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008), Siddiqi et al. (2009) and Abimbola
et al. (2014). Governance is a practice, dependent on arrangements
set at political or national level, but which needs to be
operationalized by individuals at lower levels in the health system;
multi-level frameworks acknowledge this and recognize the import-
ance of actors at different levels. Some assessment frameworks expli-
citly mention pre requisites needed for successful application, such
as the framework by Baez-Camargo and Jacobs (2011) which re-
quires a governance problem to be already identified, and the cyber-
netic model presented by Smith et al. (2013) which requires users’
familiarity with the health system.
This review also illustrates that health system governance is com-
plex and difficult to assess; the concept of governance originates
from different disciplines and is multidimensional. Governance
more generally has been debated and studied from many different
perspectives. This review attempts to synthesize how these perspec-
tives have led to the development of governance in health systems.
Critical analysis shows that frameworks for assessing governance
may be applicable in one setting but not another. There is no single,
agreed framework that can serve all purposes as the concept of gov-
ernance will likely continue to be interpreted openly and flexibly.
However, for governance principles to contribute to health system
strengthening in countries, and ultimately to impact on outcomes, it
is critical to at least evaluate and monitor if and how governance
works (or not) in practice. As each health system operates in its own
context, and different components of governance may need to be
prioritized over others in different settings and at different times, it
is important that any assessment of governance recognizes the par-
ticular circumstances and has a clear purpose. Assessing health sys-
tems governance can raise awareness of its importance to health
policy makers, identify problems or conversely, document success
stories. This can encourage and catalyse improvement in health sys-
tems. The aim of this review was to provide an overview of
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frameworks available and describe how they have been developed,
adapted or applied to assess health systems governance in operation.
We recognize that the main utility of the synthesis is not to identify
features of a single agreed framework, rather the frameworks identi-
fied and reviewed can help assessors to identify relevant questions to
ask of health systems governance, and identify elements that could
be included in an assessment.
Outside of the limited evidence on how governance can be assessed
in health systems, this review also highlights examples of how govern-
ance has been assessed in other disciplines. Both rules-based and
outcomes-based approaches to assess governance have been critiqued
for their limitations as they largely depend on how and what you pro-
pose to measure (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Though such assess-
ments provide valuable insights, the approach is somehow limited as it
often fails to be explicit about the measurement (Chhotray and Stoker
2009). This highlights that it is more important to identify what
governance arrangements are considered appropriate for a particular
context (prescriptive measures) than to judge the governance of a par-
ticular system (diagnostic measures) (Chhotray and Stoker 2009).
The findings of this review could help to inform discussions among
policy makers in countries considering governance as a mechanism to
support health systems strengthening. Findings will help decision mak-
ers form a view on what governance is, and which principles are im-
portant in their context. Policy implementers at a more local level may
choose and adapt one of the available frameworks or tools to assess
governance and/or identify gaps in governance arrangements.
Conclusions
A variety of frameworks to assess health systems governance exist,
but there are not many examples of their application in the litera-
ture. There is a need to validate and apply the existing frameworks
and share lessons learnt regarding which frameworks work well in
which settings to inform how existing frameworks can be adapted.
A comprehensive assessment of governance could enable policy
makers to prioritize solutions for problems identified as well as rep-
licate and scale-up examples of good practice. Governance is not an
‘apolitical’ process, and there are no absolute principles that define
governance; it is a diffuse concept that cuts across disciplines, and
borrows from a range of social science theories. However, whether
it is applied to health systems or political science, governance is con-
cerned with how different actors in a given system or organization
function and operate and the reasons for this. In the context of
health systems governance, we believe a multidisciplinary approach
to assessment is necessary.
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